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INTRODUCTION 
 
According to Dicken (1998, p316) MVI was the key manufacturing industry for most 
of the middle decades of the twentieth century. Peter Drucker (1946, p149) called 
MVI “the industry of industries”. The reason Drucker made this statement is clear if 
we consider the industry‟s scale, the share in total manufacturing employment, GDP 
and exports as well as its numerous forward and backward linkages with the rest of the 
economy . 
According to Maxton and Wormald (1995) MVI today is the largest manufacturing 
activity in the world. By 1993, there were approximately 470 million cars in operation 
in the world, of which 75% were in the USA and Europe (p.77). „Three quarters of the 
vehicles produced are cars, the remainder vans, trucks and buses‟, (p.78). When the 
efects on other industries (e.g. feeder industries) are considered, the impact is 
phenomenal. „Of the 50m vehicles produced in 1990, each contains at least 5000 
individual parts of widely varying materials (p.78). But the impact is not just limited to 
feeder industries. Apart from the industry that produces spare parts, there is also 
industries supplying fuel, finance, insurance as well as car distribution and sales 
companies (p.78). 
 MVI has often been described as a „mature‟ industry and the car as a „mature‟ 
product. This perception of the industry has often been linked with Vernon‟s product 
cycle model of FDI, which suggests that a mature product will eventually be produced 
in the developing world where lower costs of production will help the industry to stay 
competitive (Vernon, 1973). 
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However, a five-year study at MIT, i.e. MIT International Motor Vehicle Program, 
tends to differ from this perspective for a number of reasons that include technological 
change (the rise of lean production technologies) and consumer preference (Womack 
et. al. 1990). We will deal with these issues later. In what follows we will chart the 
evolution of MVI world-wide, consider the options (strategies) in technology transfer 
in the sector to the developing countries and speculate about the future of MVI. 
THE EVOLUTION OF MVI 
At this stage we are not concerned with the origins of MVI. But it is clear that early 
stages of this industry involved craft production. For instance cars were made in small 
workshops, in small batches and were custom-made. The volume was low, the product 
was customised and worker skill requirements were high. Variety of product range was 
high and supplier-producer relations were close geographically. This state of 
technology and demand accounts for the fact that in Britain and the USA there were 
hundreds and perhaps thousands of car makers. By 1910‟s the industry began to evolve 
in a dramatic way. 
 
THREE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE CAR INDUSTRY 
According to Altshuler et. al. (1984) the spread of the car industry over the world can 
be best seen in terms of three transformations from the early 20th century to the 1980‟s 
(also see the summary and analysis provided by Gwynne, 1990, chap. 10). 
These transformations are distinguished from each other by three variables: 
process/product innovation, geographical area of rapid market growth and the nation 
or region where the transformation occurred (Ibid. pp11-45). 
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I. The first transformation, 1902 – 1920‟s, involved mass production, using 
standardised parts. Ford‟s Model T was the product of such technology. Initially it 
used the USA as an area of rapid growth and was obviously associated with the USA 
as the country of origin. This was a significant development as the emerging of mass 
production techniques using the assembly line changed the nature of industry for ever. 
It created a mass market for cars in the USA and led to the growth of other industries 
including the service sector. As this development led to production of affordable cars, 
quality and customization which characterised pre-Ford state of the industry were 
compromised. Also the flexibility of previous craft-like production system was lost. 
 
II. The second transformation, 1950‟s – 1960‟s involved product differentiation with 
emphasis on product technology, but also to some extent process technology. The 
home of this transformation was Europe and the regional market consisted in Western 
European countries. 
 
This transformation was necessitated by different income levels, road conditions, etc. 
compared to the USA. Thus small 4-cylinder cars were the norm. This transformation 
had significant implications for the future of the car industry, not only in Europe but 
also in the USA and the rest of the world. The oil price rises of the early 1970‟s and 
increasing concerns about the environmental consequences of using 6-8 cylinder cars, 
led to an increasing desire by consumers to go for 4-cylinder cars. Thus by the late 
60‟s and early 70‟s there was a potential market in the US for these cars which was 
quickly filled first by European and later Japanese cars. 
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III. The third transformation is associated with the rise of the Japanese auto 
industry. This involved both product, process technology as well as management 
technology. 
 
Basically one can see here the origin of lean production involving Just-In-Time 
production and Total Quality Control. Initiated by the Toyota Corporation the rise of 
lean production spread all over the world due to its higher productivity. Lean 
production technology not only offers high productivity but also involves greater 
flexibility which enables car makers to offer greater variety of models to the market. 
 
IV. The Fourth and Fifth Transformation 
Altshuler et. al. identify a fourth transformation in the auto industry with a question 
mark (Ibid. p.12). They conjecture that by the late 1980‟s and 1990‟s there may be a 
shift to LDC‟s of car production, possibly to Brazil, Mexico and Korea. The study 
seems uncertain, both about location and technology of auto industry in the 1990‟s and 
beyond. 
 
This paper will try to consider these questioned unanswered by Altshuler et. al. It will 
also consider and evaluate in historical terms the four factors (Ibid. pp.182-83) 
believed to be shaping the future of the auto industry. Let us now go back to the first 
three transformations.  
 
The first transformation began a slow process of internationalisation of car industry 
initially through Ford Company investments in the UK in 1920s. The interwar period 
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and Second World War slowed down the process considerably. It was only after World 
War II that we see an immense increase in the pace of globalisation of car industry. It 
is clear that both changes in technology and the rise of post war international 
arrangements leading to greater liberalization of trade and investment flows facilitated 
the second and third transformations in the car industry.  
 
In the USA two of the world‟s largest producers GM and Ford led the way. Japan and 
Europe followed suit in the 1970s and 80s. The process of internationalization has, 
however, been uneven as the following discussion on German car makers will attempt 
to demonstrate. 
 
While VW was the first company in German car industry to go multinational (e.g. 
investments in Latin America and North America, 1960-70s) it took a lot longer for 
other two major German car makers, i.e., BMW and Daimler Benz to seek 
globalization. BMW‟s attempt in widening its market by moving into compact mid to 
down market cars, led it to acquire the British Rover Group in the mid 1990‟s. This 
move ended in failure, for a complex set of reasons that may not concern us here. 
BMW eventually divested from Rover. One point, however has to be mentioned. 
BMW did not Germanize the Rover brand. 
By contrast, Daimler introduced smaller, mid-priced vehicles with the promotional 
message that “you don‟t have to be rich to own a Mercedes”. But by late 1990‟s it was 
clear that his strategy was not going to work in export markets. The eventual merger 
with the US Chrysler (1998) represented a watershed. Chrysler too in contrast with 
Ford and GM had only internationalized its activities regionally (to Latin America).  
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The reason for the success of VW as an early globalizer as opposed to BMW and 
Mercedes has largely to do with the fact that VW was set up initially (under Hitler) to 
produce small affordable cars. This became a tradition and thus VW excelled in 
producing compact quality cars, which were fuel-efficient and appealed to low-mid 
market. The production process involved mass production. In contrast BMW and 
Daimler had a different tradition. They were basically family owned businesses founded 
by brilliant Austro-German engineers who excelled in quality and master craftsmanship. 
Their production was of high quality and thus high price, appealing to rich and middle 
class in both developed and developing country markets. However, the realities of 
expanding world markets, particularly in LDCs, point the way to an expanding market 
in the lower ranges of market.  
BMW‟s and Mercedes cars are still attractive to rich in developed markets. But the 
latter are at saturation point or dwindling. These carmakers will still find expanding 
markets among the rich in the LDCs. But there is a limit. The labour costs and 
transportation costs of producing in Germany and exporting to LDC make Mercedes 
cars unaffordable to the rich in these markets. Hence the assembly of Mercedes in 
Egypt as an export platform to Arab rich countries.  
The latest information on German carmakers (see Lane 2002 in Morgan, et. al. 2002) 
shows that all these companies have expanded rapidly in North America, South 
America and Asia Pacific. Although VW leads the way BMW and Mercedes are not far 
behind. 
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THE FUTURE OF CAR INDUSTRY AND STRATEGIES FOR LDCS 
Altshuler et. al. (1984, pp.182-83) mention four factors that they believe would shape 
the future of the car industry. In what follows those factors will be discussed and then 
evaluated in the light of the most recent developments in MVI. 
 
i) The Lowering of the Minimum Efficient Size (MES) in Car Assembly 
At the time they were writing the MES was 240,000 cars on a two-shift working day. 
The authors predicted that use of flexible automation would reduce this in future. 
The implication of this prediction, which has become a fact now, is that countries with 
small markets (e.g. some LDC‟s) may be chosen by MNC‟s for the final assembly 
stage.  
 
ii) New Product Technologies 
These product technologies are able to offer not only small size fuel-efficient cars but 
also larger fuel-efficient and safe models. The authors argue that new product 
technologies make „commodification‟…. Neither evident nor inevitable‟ (p182). In fact 
the trend in the 1990‟s has been towards greater customisation (see below).  
The implication of this second factor is that the auto industry is able to cater to a 
variety of tastes and incomes all over the world. Thus the scenario predicting that MVI 
will eventually move to low cost locations (LDC‟s) is ruled out. 
 
iii) MVI moves away from mass production methods to lean methods  
Lean technologies first pioneered by Toyota in Japan (Just-In-Time) involves greater 
flexibility, higher productivity partly due to minimisation of inventories and higher 
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quality due to Total Quality Control associated with JIT. The move away from mass to 
lean production methods has already taken place as more auto manufacturers world 
wide have embraced these technologies. 
 
iv) The Market for Cars Demands a Variety of Models 
This point has been partially explored under factor (ii) above and will be discussed 
below. 
Gwynne (1990) identifies two models for the future of car industry: the world car 
concept based on Gooding (1979) and „technological divergence‟ model based on the 
Altshuler (MIT Report). 
 
THE WORLD CAR 
 
This involves a basic model with standardised parts and components, which can be 
produced anywhere in the world (e.g. LDCs) with parts and components outsourced to 
many countries to take advantage of locational factors and economies of scale. This 
concept has materialized on a regional basis, e.g. Ford‟s outsourcing of parts to 15 
countries in its European operations. However it has not been realized on a global 
scale.  
 
As a consequence of the basic uniform design, and outsourcing to low cost locations 
and large economies of scale, prices can be kept at low levels and thus the product can 
compete more effectively in world markets. According to this scenario then, LDC‟s, 
especially NIC‟s would become major producers of cars. 
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TECHNOLOGICAL DIVERGENCE 
 
The rival view has been most influentially presented in the above-mentioned study by 
MIT. It envisages a future for the car industry based on both the location of demand 
for cars (notably rich countries) and high level of technological change in both product 
and process technologies. 
The conclusion drawn by Gwynne is that the second model is a better predictor of the 
future of car industry compared with the first model. As cars are demanded for a 
variety of reasons, specially in richer countries, it is the world‟s major car producers 
mostly located in rich countries, which will be in possession of productive capacity and 
required technologies to meet the market demand. As far as LDCs are concerned, the 
future is bleak. Gwynne (p.149) suggests, further, that the expansion of car industry to 
LDCs faces difficulties, with the exception of countries such as Brazil which offers a 
large market, Mexico as a country close to core markets (USA) or South Korea which 
houses dynamic MNCs.   
 
The contrast between the two models of the future of the car industry is dubious for 
the following reasons: 
1) As the experience of Egypt (Taha, 2002) shows the spread of car industry to 
LDCs is driven primarily by market factors rather than technology. 
 
2) Assembly of luxurious cars have already moved to LDC‟s as is the case with 
Mercedes in Egypt. Thus the cost advantage offered by LDC‟s at assembly 
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stage and the proximity to rich Arab countries  (locational factors) are 
important. 
 
3) The outsourcing activities of MNC‟s imply that LDC‟s may attract FDI in the 
car industry at most stages of production with the exception of R&D. 
 
THIRD WORLD CAR INDUSTRY: STRATEGIES FOR GROWTH 
According to Gwynne (pp. 148-49) within the context of declining per unit costs due 
to new process technologies and organisational methods introduced by the Japanese 
companies, the factor of low labour costs in LDC‟s holds less and less attraction for 
the MNC‟s. He identifies three strategies that developing countries could follow in 
terms of export-oriented growth: 
 
1. Technological and financial link between a domestic company of NIC and a 
Japanese MNC. 
2.  Joint ventures between domestic corporations and „world car‟ MNC‟s. 
Examples: Korean conglomerate Daewoo and Kia linking with GM and Ford to 
produce a „world car‟. But there is also a Japanese connection due to the involvement 
of Ford and GM in Japanese car producers.  
3.      Export incentives for car MNC‟s. Examples include Brazil and Mexico. 
The Experience of Egypt shows that many other companies such as Mercedes which  
link up with LDC producers in order to serve both domestic and regional export 
markets (e.g. Mid-East and North Africa). 
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The main problem with Gwynne‟s analysis is static assumptions about LDC income 
growth. Also the dynamic relationship between FDI and host country income growth 
leading to market expansion, which induces further FDI, is ignored. Both China and 
Middle East have attracted massive FDI in car industry in 1980-90s.  
 
 
THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MVI 
Altshuler et. al. were almost prophetic in their prediction and Gwynne‟s analysis was 
true for 1980‟s, but both missed a number of significant factors that are playing an 
increasing role in the global car industry. These factors have been more favourable to 
the movement of the industry to LDCs, e.g. the growing importance of international 
outsourcing of components in MVI. 
 
In what follows the above factor, among others, will be discussed. 
 
First on the technological front there are two recent developments in MVI, one of 
which concerns a further development of lean technologies, i.e. modularisation, the 
other concerns the design of cars. 
 
The first development that has been described as „contracting out the assembly line‟ 
involves the fact that what used to be an essential part of car assembly, i.e. using parts 
and components to assemble a car, is now supplied by system makers. These 
companies specialise in supplying subassemblies e.g. a car front panel complete with 
fender, headlights, etc. This implies that what was used in the various stages in the 
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continuous assembly line in car production can be broken down into subassemblies 
supplied by companies specialising in the provision of subassemblies. This development 
is in line with lean methods of production because it allows car makers greater 
flexibility, i.e. they can choose a variety of subassemblies supplied by system maker 
companies rather than design their own (Time Magazine, 1999a). 
 
The second development concerns design of cars. Market research on what consumers 
want in a car has led to a situation where most car designs converge leading to 
impersonal, mass-produced designs. The attitude to design in car making, however, is 
changing. More and more car manufacturers (e.g. Ford) are employing top designers 
to design cars that would appeal to the imagination of customers (Time Magazine, 
1999b). 
 
This is understandable from the industry‟s point of view, especially as far as rich 
country markets are concerned. Excess capacity is rampant in MVI in the North, which 
is one of the main reasons for recent mergers (e.g. Daimler-Chrysler). It is clear that 
the main car makers‟ strategy in rich markets is to appeal to customers who do not 
necessarily want to replace their old car with a new one, but those who may wish to 
own an attractive, custom-designed car. 
 
The analyses by both Altshuler and Gwynne above are based on static conditions in 
world economy. The last two decades of the 20
th
 century witnessed rising incomes in 
Asia, South America and Middle East. Furthermore, locational factors (including lower 
costs) in these regions have become prominent in the outsourcing decisions of car 
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multinationals. Thus FDI in car industry is both market and cost driven. Also, although 
global car business remains dominated by a few large transnationals, increasing 
international competition in all industries since World War II (Auerbach 1988) has 
continued unabated. Thus in recent years Ford has increasingly served its home market 
(USA) from assembly operatins in Mexico due to the presence of Japanese car makers 
in the US.  
 
The following most recent developments in global car industry will demonstrate the 
accuracy of the analysis above.  
 
Japanese carmakers which until recently limited their operations to Japan or high 
income markets are increasingly moving to Asia and South America. Toyota and 
Nissan are prominent examples. There is an increasing trend for both outsourcing of 
components and final assembly to China and South America to take advantage of 
lower costs and large potential markets (FT 2003, Jan 18, p. 29). 
 
Even in luxury car divisions in spite of the significance of R&D as well as product and 
quality technology, there is a marked tendency to move to lower cost locations, 
particularly if these places also offer large markets. Mercedes assembly operations in 
Egypt to serve the rich Gulf markets (Taha 2002) is a good case in point. Daimler-
Chrysler has also been moving to Asia. As Ford has been losing money in its flagship 
business portfolios acquired recently, i.e. Volvo, Jaguar and Landrover, leading to 
attempts at restructuring them (FT 2003, Feb. 14, pp 21 and 28) it would not be 
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surprising if they also move some of their operations (including assembly) to low cost 
countries.    
 
THIRD WORLD CAR PRODUCTION 
We can distinguish two different strategies in MVI in LDC‟s pursued since the 1950‟s. 
We shall call them the Latin American Model and the Asian Model. 
 
The Latin American Model has involved import-substitution industrialisation through 
massive FDI primarily from the US and Europe. By contrast, the Asian Model has 
involved joint ventures with Japanese and American car makers, with strong export-
orientation. 
 
In the 1960‟s, the Latin American Model was considered as the norm by most 
economists and policy-makers. It involved FDI (e.g. Ford Motor Company investments 
in Brazil), high domestic content requirements by the host government, primary 
orientation to serving domestic markets with the possibility and desirability of servicing 
some foreign markets. The 1960‟s-1970‟s were the golden age of ISI, particularly in 
MVI in Latin America. For instance, Brazil attracted massive FDI in this sector, which 
managed to service both domestic markets and to some extent foreign markets. Brazil 
became the source of exports for some VW models to the US market. But the success 
of the Latin American Model came to an end in the 1970‟s. In spite of government 
incentives and subsidies to the sector with a view to export cars from Brazil, MNC's 
such as Ford stopped investing in Brazil. The main reason was the strict domestic 
content required by the government. 
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The 1970‟s witnessed the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates. The flexibility of exchange-rates that followed the collapse of the Bretton-
Woods system had significant implications for the pattern of industrialisation and 
technology transfer to LDC‟s. One such consideration involved the fact that auto parts 
could be outsourced more economically from countries with devalued exchange rates. 
 
Apart from this fact, it is also apparent that countries that pursued strict ISI policies 
fostered inefficient (highly protected) feeder industries. MVI uses thousands of parts in 
assembling cars, trucks, etc. In the 1970‟s MVI in the USA and Europe were 
attempting to meet the challenge from Japanese car makers. The strategy adopted, e.g. 
by Ford, was to outsource its parts, components and subassemblies from single 
suppliers located in a large number of countries. 
 
This strategy basically invalidated the transitional models of technology transfer. Thus 
the feeder industries would not necessarily be located in a host country where cars are 
assembled. It would be spread around the globe to take advantage of both lower costs 
of production and economies of scale. This strategy by Ford effectively challenged 
traditional models of technology transfer (see Shamsavari, et. al., 2002) 
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STRATEGIES OF HOST COUNTRIES AND OPTIONS FOR LDC 
 
According to Gwynne (1990) the only options available to LDC are wither joint 
ventures between LDC private sector/government and MMC. S. Korea, Malaysia or 
export incentives to MMC (Brazil).  
 
The Egyptian experience (Taha, 2002) shows that there are a multitude of routes that a 
LDC can acquire technology in the car industry apart from joint ventures and export 
incentives. There is for example turnkey contract. Under a turnkey contract a country 
may acquire a car assembly plant that will show 20-40% domestic contract (Mercedes 
in Egypt). This may seem like very little technology transfer (assembly only). But if one 
considers the potential of export earnings from such a contract, the benefits are too 
evident. The country will have good foreign exchange earnings which help the foreign 
debt servicing. This will release resources for imports that are vitally needed to further 
technology/knowledge transfer, etc.  
 
Yet there is another route for LDCs. First experienced in Mexico, a country may excel 
in producing parts, components and subassemblies for car industry, a circumstance 
which may lead to transfer technology at a basic level (feeder/ supplier industries). This 
transfer of know how can take place under a licensing agreement or may involve FDI 
(for example GM, Ford, Daewoo, etc. in Egypt). 
 
The increasing importance of both strategic and locational networks implies that LDCs 
can play a significant role in integrating into networks. For instance, it is clear that the 
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activities of car MNC‟s in Egypt is aimed at creating a regional (North Africa) 
network, which will serve that region. 
 
Thus options for LDC in technology transfer from car MNC‟s are quite wide. 
However, LDCs should not lose sight of their long-term development objectives by 
adopting an open door policy towards MNC‟s. The Chinese experience shows that a 
planned and orderly approach towards MNCs has significant payoffs. The Chinese 
government has been able to attract massive amounts of FDI (including joint ventures, 
e.g. VW) by creating EPZs and a host of other policy measures to ensure that  FDI and 
other MNC routes of market entry serve China‟s long term development needs. 
 
In the light of the above discussion there are a number of strategies that a host country 
can adopt (see Gwynne, chap.10; Malecki, chaps.2, 7 & 8; Howells & Wood, chap. 9): 
1) Improve the skills and educational standards of the work force and ensure that 
MNC‟s are committed to the education of the domestic labour force. As 
education and technical training is essential to the diffusion of transferred 
technology in the economy a systematic educational programme with co-
operation among the host government, host companies and the MNCs is 
essential 
2) Ensure that MNCs are committed to export competitiveness and thus export 
growth. As one of the most beneficial effects of FDI in host countries is its 
contribution to export growth in the latter, export competitiveness remains 
crucial for this strategy (UNCTAD 2002).  
  19  
3) As far as possible, discourage cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
by MNCs and encourage greenfield investments, as the first path does not lead 
to fresh capital formation, a process that is badly needed in LDCs UNCTAD 
2000).  
4) Survey the technological capabilities of the country and establish a strategy to 
enhance existing capabilities. Without such a policy initiative there will be a lot 
of duplication of effort and investment and foreign exchange loss by the LDC. 
5) To insist on domestic content requirement only to the extent that domestic 
feeder industries meet international standards in quality and price (see point 8 
below). 
6) Encourage domestic research and development in MVI that is most relevant to 
the specific conditions of the country and develop links between research 
establishments, universities and domestic and foreign companies. 
7) Ensure that MNC‟s are transferring appropriate technologies. Appropriateness 
here refer to both factor endowments in the host LDC and the cost for the host 
country in foreign exchange. 
8) Encourage MNCs to invest in supplier industries. UNCTAD (2001) shows how 
important the linkage between MNCs and domestic host country firms is for 
economic development in LDCs. As indicated in Taha (2001) investment by 
multinationals in domestic suppliers companies is vital for establishing such 
linkages. Why is this important? One of the reasons that an MNC may 
outsource parts and components for assembly operations outside the host 
country may be the low quality of these parts produced domestically. By 
investing in a supplier company the MNC will be able to help the supplier 
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company to achieve a better quality at a lower price. The gain for the host 
country can be immense as the process will involve enhanced technological 
capability. As mutual investments by customer and supplying companies are 
quite common in many industries, there is no reason why this cannot be 
practised in developing countries. Taha (ibid) identifies feeder/supplier 
industries in Egypt as one of the main arenas for technological transfer in MVI. 
Encouraging collaborative, long term  relationships between MNCs and 
domestic firms, leading to strategic alliances is key to both technology transfer 
and development of the host developing country. 
Another point that enhances the argument above is the fact that any supplier firms in 
car industry are more labour intensive than assembly operations. Thus investment in 
feeder industries is important for the employment situation in developing countries. 
 
The most likely scenario for car MNC‟s in the South is to select a number of countries 
that offer favourable advantages in terms of tax breaks, low cost, trained and 
disciplined labour, good infrastructure, political stability etc. From this perspective they 
wish to be free from domestic content requirements and enjoy export subsidies and 
incentives. They may wish to engage in joint ventures with domestic companies and 
transfer technology at various levels depending on the technological capabilities of the 
host country and global considerations, e.g. the availability of low cost sources of raw 
materials and parts, components and subassemblies. 
 
As for the car MNC‟s strategy for expansion to the South, one thing is clear: as the 
customers in countries in the South are not as much concerned with design and 
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personalised aspects of a car, the strategy would be to assemble cars in selected 
locations for home consumption and export markets. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have reviewed changes in MVI world-wide since its beginning, which 
has involved changing technologies and world economic conditions. We have also 
discussed the shift of technology from North to South and options for LDCs in the 
transfer of technology and policies to maximise the benefits of MNC investment and 
other activities for host LDCs. 
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